## Process over state: Math is about proofs, not theorems.

August 10, 2019 2 Comments

A couple of days ago, Maylin and I went to pick blackberries along some trails near our house. We spent a number of hours doing it and eventually I turned all those berries into one half-litre jar of jam.

On the way to the blackberry trails, we passed a perfectly fine Waitrose — a supermarket that sells (among countless other things) jam. A supermarket I had to go to later anyways to get jamming sugar. Why didn’t we just buy the blackberries or the jam itself? It wasn’t a matter of money: several hours of our time picking berries and cooking them cost much more than a half-litre of jam, even from Waitrose.

I think that we spent time picking the berries and making the jam for the same reason that mathematicians prove theorems.

Imagine that you had a machine where you put in a statement and it replied with perfect accuracy if that statement was true or false (or maybe ill-posed). Would mathematicians welcome such a machine? It seems that Hilbert and the other formalists at the start of the 20th century certainly did. They wanted a process that could resolve any mathematical statement.

Such a hypothetical machine would be a Waitrose for theorems.

But is math just about establishing the truth of mathematical statements? More importantly, is the math that is written for other mathematicians just about establishing the truth of mathematical statements?

I don’t think so.

Math is about ideas. About techniques for thinking and proving things. Not just about the outcome of those techniques.

This is true of much of science and philosophy, as well. So although I will focus this post on the importance of process over state/outcome in pure math, I think it can also be read from the perspective of process over state in science or philosophy more broadly.

## Web of C-lief: conjectures vs. model assumptions vs. scientific beliefs

August 31, 2019 by Artem Kaznatcheev 2 Comments

A sketch of the theoretical computer science Web of C-lief weaved by the non-contradiction spider.

In this post, I want to play with Quine’s web of belief metaphor in the context of science. This will force us to restrict it to specific domains instead of the grand theory that Quine intended. From this, I can then adapt the metaphor from belief in science to c-liefs in mathematics. This will let me discuss how complexity class seperation conjectures are structured in theoretical computer science and why this is fundamentally different from model assumptions in natural science.

So let’s start with a return to the relevant philosophy.

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Filed under Commentary, Preliminary Tagged with cstheory, metamodeling, philosophy of math, philosophy of science