March 28, 2015 4 Comments
A recurrent theme here in TheEGG is the limits and reliability of knowledge. These get explored from many directions: on epistemological grounds, from the philosophy of science angle, but also formally, through game theory and simulations. In this post, I will explore the topic of misbeliefs as adaptations. Misbeliefs will be intended as ideas about reality that a given subject accepts as true, despite them being wrong, inaccurate or otherwise mistaken. The notion that evolution might not systematically and exclusively support true beliefs isn’t new to TheEGG, but it has also been tackled by many other people, by means of different methodologies, including my own personal philosophising. The overarching question is whether misbeliefs can be systematically adaptive, a prospect that tickles my devious instincts: if it were the case, it would fly in the face of naïve rationalists, who frequently assume that evolution consistently favours the emergence of truthful ways to perceive the world.
Given our common interests, Artem and I have had plenty of long discussions in the past couple of years, mostly sparked by his work on Useful Delusions (see Kaznatcheev et al., 2014), for some more details on our exchanges, as well as a little background on myself, please see the notes. A while ago, I found an article by McKay and Dennett (M&D), entitled “The evolution of misbelief” (2009), Artem offered me the chance to write a guest post on it, and I was very happy to accept.
What follows will mix philosophical, clinical and mathematical approaches, with the hope to produce a multidisciplinary synthesis.
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