Colour, psychophysics, and the scientific vs. manifest image of reality

Recently on TheEGG, I’ve been writing a lot about the differences between effective (or phenomenological) and reductive theories. Usually, I’ve confined this writing to evolutionary biology; especially the tension between effective and reductive theories in the biology of microscopic systems. For why this matters to evolutionary game theory, see Kaznatcheev (2017, 2018).

But I don’t think that microscopic systems are the funnest place to see this interplay. The funnest place to see this is in psychology.

In the context of psychology, you can add an extra philosophical twist. Instead of differentiating between reductive and effective theories; a more drastic difference can be drawn between the scientific and manifest image of reality.

In this post, I want to briefly talk about how our modern theories of colour vision developed. This is a nice example of good effective theory leading before any reductive basis. And with that background in mind, I want to ask the question: are colours real? Maybe this will let me connect to some of my old work on interface theories of perception (see Kaznatcheev, Montrey, and Shultz, 2014).

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