## Pairwise games as a special case of public goods

February 21, 2015 11 Comments

Usually, when we are looking at public goods games, we consider an agent interacting with a group of *n* other agents. In our minds, we often imagine *n* to be large, or sometimes even take the limit as *n* goes to infinity. However, this isn’t the only limit that we should consider when we are grooming our intuition. It is also useful to scale to pairwise games by setting *n = 1*. In the case of a non-linear public good game with constant cost, this results in a game given by two parameters — the difference in the benefit of the public good from having *1* instead of *0* and *2* instead of *1* contributor in the group, respectively; measured in multiples of the cost *c*. In that case, if we want to recreate any two-strategy pairwise cooperate-defect game with the canonical payoff matrix then just set and . Alternatively, if you want a free public good (*c = 0*) then use and . I’ll leave verifying the arithmetic as an exercise for you, dear reader.

In this post, I want to use this sort of *n = 1* limit to build a little bit more intuition for the double public good games that I built recently with Robert Vander Velde, David Basanta, and Jacob Scott to think about acid-mediated tumor invasion. In the process, we will get to play with some simplexes to classify the nine qualitatively distinct dynamics of this limit and write another page in my open science notebook.

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