An approach towards ethics: neuroscience and development

For me personally it has always been a struggle, reading through all the philosophical and religious literature I have a long standing interest in, to verbalize my intuitive concept of morals in any satisfactory way. Luckily for me, once I’ve started reading up on modern psychology and neuroscience, I found out that there are empirical models based on clustering of the abundant concepts that correlate well with both our cultured intuitions and our knowledge of brain functioning. Models that are for the studies of Ethics what the Big Five traits are for personality theories or what the Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory is for cognitive abilities.  In this post I’m going to provide an account of research of what is the most elucidating level of explanation of human morals – that of neuroscience and psychology. The following is not meant as a comprehensive review, but a sample of what I consider the most useful explanatory tools. The last section touches briefly upon genetic and endocrinological component of human morals, but it is nothing more than a mention. Also, I’ve decided to omit citations in quotes, because I don’t want to include into the list of reference the research I am personally unfamiliar with.

A good place to start is Jonathan Haidt’s TED talk:

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Space and stochasticity in evolutionary games

Two of my goals for TheEGG this year are to expand the line up of contributors and to extend the blog into a publicly accessible venue for active debate about preliminary, in-progress, and published projects; a window into the everyday challenges and miracles of research. Toward the first goal, we have new contributions from Jill Gallaher late last year and Alexander Yartsev this year with more posts taking shape as drafts from Alex, Marcel Montrey, Dan Nichol, Sergio Graziosi, Milo Johnson, and others. For the second goal, we have an exciting debate unfolding that was started when my overview of Archetti (2013,2014) prompted an objection from Philip Gerlee in the comments and Philipp Altrock on twitter. Subsequently, Philip and Philipp combined their objections into a guest post that begat an exciting comment thread with thoughtful discussion between David Basanta, Robert Vander Velde, Marc Harper, and Philip. Last Thursday, I wrote about how my on-going project with Robert, David, and Jacob Scott is expanding on Archetti’s work and was surprised to learn that Philip has responded on twitter with the same criticism as before. I was a little flabbergast by this because I thought that I had already addressed Philip’s critique in my original comment response and that he was reiterating the same exact text in his guest post simply for completeness and record, not because he thought it was still a fool-proof objection.

My biggest concern now is the possibility that Philip and I are talking past each other instead of engaging in a mutually beneficial dialogue. As such, I will use this post to restate (my understand of the relevant parts of) Philip and Philipp’s argument and extend it further, providing a massive bibliography for readers interested in delving deeper into this. In a future post, I will offer a more careful statement of my response. Hopefully Philip or other readers will clarify any misunderstandings or misrepresentations in my summary or extension. Since this discussion started in the context of mathematical oncology, I will occasionally reference cancer, but the primary point at issue is one that should be of interest to all evolutionary game theorists (maybe even most mathematical modelers): the model complexity versus simplicity tension that arises from the stochastic to deterministic transition and the discrete to continuous transition.

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An approach towards ethics: primate sociality

Moral decision making is one of the major torrents in human behavior. It often overrides other ways of making judgments, it generates conflicting sets of cultural values and is reinforced by them. Such conflicts might even occur in the head of some unfortunate individual, which makes the process really creative. On the other hand ethical behavior is the necessary social glue and the way people prioritize prosocial practices.

In the comments to his G+ post about Michael Sandel’s Justice course, Artem Kaznatcheev invited me to have a take on moral judgment and social emotions based on what I gathered through my readings in the recent couple of years. I’m by no means an expert in any of the fields that I touch upon in the following considerations, but I’ve been purposefully struggling with the topic due to my interest in behavioral sciences trying to come up with a lucid framework to think about the subject. Not everything I write here is backed up very well by research, mainly because I step up a little and try to see what might come next, but I’ll definitely do my best to leave my general understanding distinct from concepts prevailing in the studies I have encountered. It is not an essay on ethics per se, but rather where I am now in understanding how moral sentiments work. A remark to make is that for the purposes of that text I understand behavior broadly, e.g. thinking is a behavior.

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Double public goods games and acid-mediated tumor invasion

Although I’ve spent more time thinking about pairwise games, I’ve recently expanded my horizons to more serious considerations of public-goods games. They crop up frequently when we are modeling agents at the cellular level, since interacts are often indirect through production of some sort of common extra-cellular signal. Unlike the trivial to characterize two strategy pairwise games, two strategy public-goods have a more sophisticated range of possible dynamics. However, through a nice trick using the properties of Bernstein polynomials, Archetti (2013,2014) and Peña et al. (2014a) have greatly increased our understanding of the public good, and I will be borrowing heavily from the toolbag and extending it slightly in this post. I will discuss the obvious continuation of this work by considering more than two strategies and several public goods together. Unfortunately, the use of public goods games here — and of evolutionary game theory (EGT) more generally — is not without controversy. This extension is not meant to address the controversy of spatial structure (although for progress on this, see Peña et al., 2014b), but the rigorous qualitative analysis that I’ll use (mostly in a the next post on this project) will allow me to side-step much of the parameter-fitting issues.

Of course, having two public goods games is only interesting if we couple them to each other. In this case, we will have one public good from which everyone benefits, but the second good is anti-correlated in the sense that only those that don’t contribute to the first can benefit from the second. A more general analysis of all possible ways to correlate two public-goods game might be a fun future direction, but at this point it is not clear what other correlations would be useful for modeling; at least in mathematical oncology.

By the way, if you are curious what mathematical oncology research looks like, it is often just scribbles like this emailed back and forth:

equations

I’ll use the rest of this post to guide you through the ideas behind the above sketch, and thus introduce you to the joint project that I am working on with Robert Vander Velde, David Basanta, and Jacob Scott. Treat this as a page from my open research notebook.

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Truthiness of irrelevant detail in explanations from neuroscience to mathematical models

TruthinessTruthiness is the truth that comes from the gut, not books. Truthiness is preferring propositions that one wishes to be true over those known to be true. Truthiness is a wonderful commentary on the state of politics and media by a fictional character determined to be the best at feeling the news at us. Truthiness is a one word summary of emotivism.

Truthiness is a lot of things, but all of them feel far from the hard objective truths of science.

Right?

Maybe an ideal non-existent non-human Platonic capital-S Science, but at least science as practiced — if not all conceivable versions of it — is very much intertwined with politics and media. Both internal to the scientific community: how will I secure the next grant? who should I cite to please my reviewers? how will I sell this to get others reading? And external: how can we secure more funding for science? how can we better incorporate science into schools? how can we influence policy decisions? I do not want to suggest that this tangle is (all) bad, but just that it exists and is prevalent. Thus, critiques of politics and media are relevant to a scientific symposium in much the same way as they are relevant to a late-night comedy show.

I want to discuss an aspect of truthiness in science: making an explanation feel more scientific or more convincing through irrelevant detail. The two domains I will touch on is neuroscience and mathematical modeling. The first because in neuroscience I’ve been acquainted with the literature on irrelevant detail in explanations and because neuroscientific explanations have a profound effect on how we perceive mental health. The second because it is the sort of misrepresentation I fear of committing the most in my own work. I also think the second domain should matter more to the working scientist; while irrelevant neurological detail is mostly misleading to the neuroscience-naive general public, irrelevant mathematical detail can be misleading, I feel, to the mathematically-naive scientists — a non-negligible demographic.

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What makes a discipline ‘mathematical’?

While walking to work on Friday, I was catching up on one of my favorite podcasts: The History of Philosophy without any Gaps. To celebrate the podcast’s 200th episode, Peter Adamson was interviewing Jill Kraye and John Marenbon on medieval philosophy. The podcasts was largely concerned with where we should define the temporal boundaries of medieval philosophy, especially on the side that bleeds into the Renaissance. A non-trivial, although rather esoteric question — even compared to some of the obscure things I go into on this blog, and almost definitely offtopic for TheEGG — but it is not what motivated me to open today’s post with this anecdote. Instead, I was caught by Jill Kraye’s passing remark:

MertonCollege
[T]he Merton school, which was a very technical mathematical school of natural philosophy in 14th century England; they applied mechanical ideas to medicine

I’ve never heard of the Merton school before — which a quick search revealed to be also known as the Oxford Calculators; named after Richard Swinehead‘s Book of Calculations — but it seems that they introduced much more sophisticated mathematical reasoning into the secundum imaginationem — philosophical thought experiments or intuition pumps — that were in vogue among their contemporaries. They even beat Galileo to fundamental insights that we usually attribute to him, like the mean speed theorem. Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to find sources on the connection to medicine, although Peter Adamson and Jill Kraye have pointed me to a couple of books.

Do you have pointers, dear reader?

But this serendipitous encounter, did prompt an interesting lunchtime discussion with Arturo Araujo, Jill Gallaher, and David Basanta. I asked them what they thought the earliest work in mathematical medicine was, but as my interlocutors offered suggestion, I kept moving the goalposts and the conversation quickly metamorphosed from history to philosophy. The question became: What makes a discipline ‘mathematical’?

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A year in books: philosophy, psychology, and political economy

If you follow the Julian calendar — which I do when I need a two week extension on overdue work — then today is the first day of 2015.

Happy Old New Year!

This also means that this is my last day to be timely with a yet another year-in-review post; although I guess I could also celebrate the Lunar New Year on February 19th. Last year, I made a resolution to read one not-directly-work-related book a month, and only satisfied it in an amortized analysis; I am repeating the resolution this year. Since I only needed two posts to catalog the practical and philosophical articles on TheEGG, I will try something new with this one: a list and mini-review of the books I read last year to meet my resolution. I hope that based on this, you can suggest some books for me to read in 2015; or maybe my comments will help you choose your next book to read. I know that articles and blogs I’ve stumbled across have helped guide my selection. If you want to support TheEGG directly and help me select the books that I will read this year then consider donating something from TheEGG wishlist.

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Cataloging a year of blogging: the philosophical turn

Passion and motivation are strange and confusing facets of being. Many things about them feel paradoxical. For example, I really enjoy writing, categorizing, and — obviously, if you’ve read many of the introductory paragraphs on TheEGG — blabbing on far too long about myself. So you’d expect that I would have been extremely motivated to write up this index of posts from the last year. Yet I procrastinated — although in a mildly structured way — on it for most of last week, and beat myself up all weekend trying to force words into this textbox. A rather unpleasant experience, although it did let me catch up on some Batman cartoons from my childhood. Since you’re reading this now, I’ve succeeded and received my hit of satisfaction, but the high variance in my motivation to write baffles me.

More fundamentally, there is the paradox of agency. It feels like my motivations and passions are aspects of my character, deeply personal and defining. Yet, it is naive to assume that they are determined by my ego; if I take a step back, I can see how my friends, colleagues, and even complete strangers push and pull the passions and motivations that push and pull me. For example, I feel like TheEGG largely reflects my deep-seated personal interests, but my thoughts do not come from me alone, they are shaped by my social milieu — or more dangerously by Pavlov’s buzzer of my stats page, each view and comment and +1 conditioning my tastes. Is the heavy presence of philosophical content because I am interested in philosophy, or am I interested in philosophy because that is what people want to read? That is the tension that bothers me, but it is clear that my more philosophical posts are much more popular than the practical. If we measure in terms of views then in 2014 new cancer-related posts accounted for only 4.7% of the traffic (with 15 posts), the more abstract cstheory perspective on evolution accounted for 6.6% (with 5 posts), while the posts I discuss below accounted for 57.4% (the missing chunk of unity went to 2014 views of post from 2012 and 2013). Maybe this is part of the reason why there was 24 philosophical posts, compared to the 20 practical posts I highlighted in the first part of this catalog.

Of course, this example is a little artificial, since although readership statistics are fun distraction, they are not particularly relevant just easy to quantify. Seeing the influence of the ideas I read is much more difficult. Although I think these exercises in categorization can help uncover them. In this post, I review the more philosophical posts from last year, breaking them down less autobiographically and more thematically: interfaces and useful delusions; philosophy of the Church-Turing thesis; Limits of science and dangers of mathematics; and personal reflections on philosophy and science. Let me know if you can find some coherent set of influences.

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Cataloging a year of blogging: cancer and biology

Welcome to 111101111.

Another year has come to an end, and it is time to embrace tradition and reflect on the past twelve months. In fact, I will try to do one better and start a new tradition: cataloging a year of blogging.

Last year, I split up the 83 content heavy posts of 2013 into nine categories in three themes: established applications of evolutionary game theory (ethnocentrism and the public good; and mathematical oncology), expanding from behavior to society and mind (representations and rationality for replicators; feedback between finance & economics and ecology & evolution; and, learning, intelligence, and the social brain), and envisioning the algorithmic world (proof, automata, and physics; natural algorithms and biology; fitness landscapes and evolutionary equilibria; and, metamodeling and the (algorithmic) philosophy of science). In 2014 there was a sharp decrease in number of posts with only 44 articles of new content (and the 3 posts cataloging 2013, so 47 total) — this was due to a nearly 4 month blogging silence in the middle of the year — but a quarter increase in readership with 151,493 views compared to 2013’s 119,935 views. This time, I will need only two posts to survey the past year; this post for the practical and the next for the philosophical.

MathOncoFor me, the year was distributed between three cities, the usual suspects of Montreal and New York, and in October I moved down to Tampa, Florida to work with David Basanta and Jacob Scott in the Intergrated Mathematical Oncology department of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute. A winter without snow is strange but wearing shorts in December makes up for it; plus the sunsets over the Gulf of Mexico are absolutely beautiful. Unsurprisingly, this move has meant that the practical aspects of my focus have shifted almost completely to biology; cancer, in particular.

This post is about the biology and oncology articles that made up about half of last year’s content. Given the autobiographical turn of this post, it will be (loosely) structured around three workshops that I attended in 2014, and the online conversations and collaborations that TheEGG was a host to.
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